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The euro area and the common monetary policy
In 2009 euro area GDP posted an unprecedented fall of 4.1%. Nonetheless, in the second half 
of the year a faltering recovery began which, on available projections, should firm up through-
out 2010, albeit with relatively moderate increases in activity. Inflation also showed a very 
pronounced change in trajectory, falling in the first half of the year and subsequently rising, 
which was largely linked to developments in energy goods prices. The increase in the harmo-
nised index of consumer prices (HICP) averaged 0.3%, its lowest rate since the start of EMU 
(see Table 4.1). Existing projections point to inflation stabilising at low and slightly higher than 
current levels against a backdrop of a modest pick-up in activity, under-utilisation of productive 
capacity and subdued wage growth derived from the sluggish labour market.
In any event, these central scenarios envisaged for GDP and inflation are subject to a high 
degree of uncertainty, partly linked to factors external to the euro area, such as changes in 
global activity and commodities prices on international markets, but especially to internal fac-
tors related to weak demand, labour market developments and the need for financial institu-
tions to continue to strengthen their balance sheets. Similarly, the fiscal crisis in Greece gave 
rise to bouts of extreme instability in 2010 H1 posing most considerable challenges and trig-
gering unprecedented institutional reactions in the euro area as a whole. The role of economic 
policies will be key in determining the pace and speed of the recovery. It is essential to under-
take structural reforms and ambitious, lasting fiscal consolidation to ensure the sustainability 
of public finances and to safeguard financial stability in the euro area, and also to strengthen 
the institutional framework of economic governance. These are the main issues which will be 
described in the following sections.
The recession dating from spring 2008 worsened in the half-year from October 2008 to March 
2009, turning into a slump in activity - of more than 4% - unprecedented in the history of the 
euro area (see Chart 4.1). This contraction was not unrelated to the protracted and deep glo-
bal financial crisis, the resurgence of which from mid-2008 resulted in notably higher risk 
premia, sharp falls in financial asset prices - with the consequent impact on bank balance 
sheets and on household wealth - and tighter bank lending standards. As a result of the global 
and synchronised nature of the crisis, external demand contracted sharply, as evidenced by 
the strong fall in exports. The recession in the euro area, in conjunction with the additional 
deterioration in financial conditions, prompted a marked worsening of agents’ expectations as 
to the behaviour of activity and employment. This spurred household saving to the detriment 
of household consumption and discouraged spending on house purchases, thus quickening 
the downward adjustment which had begun previously in residential investment in some euro 
area countries. For their part, firms sharply restricted productive investment - which fell by 
nearly 12% between October 2008 and March 2009 - and began to run down inventories, 
following a possibly undesired accumulation associated with the decrease in sales.
GDP fell in all euro area countries, albeit to varying extents largely reflecting the differing weight 
and degree of deterioration of residential investment and exports (see Chart 4.1). Thus, in coun-
tries such as Spain and Ireland, which had seen a bigger real estate boom, the downturn in 
residential investment was sharper and resulted in greater job losses, which in turn seem to 
have contributed to a sharper contraction in private consumption (although the impact on GDP 
was cushioned by the fall-off in imports). In others, such as Germany and Finland, the heaviest 
strains came from the external sector (given their specialisation in the production of capital 
equipment, hard hit by the worldwide fall in investment), so the main downward pressure on 
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activity was from net external demand. Meanwhile, France showed a more moderate contrac-
tion of GDP, since it is less exposed to the aforementioned factors. That is in contrast to Italy, 
where the crisis exacerbated both the lack of vigour of exports (linked to such factors as the 
pattern of productive specialisation and the cumulative loss of competitiveness) and the per-
sistent sluggishness of domestic demand.
Euro area employment responded to the fall in production with a slight lag, in an adjust-
ment process which has been prolonged despite the slight recovery in activity. This was 
reflected in a notable increase in the unemployment rate, which reached 10% in the open-
ing months of 2010. The downturn in employment is proving to be relatively subdued, if 
the sharp fall in output is taken into account. This is clearly different from the recent expe-
rience in other economies (including most notably the United States) and from previous 
The impact of the crisis on 
employment was relatively 
cushioned, with large 
differences between countries
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
DEMAND AND OUTPUT (quarter-on-quarter rates)
Gross domestic product 2.7 0.5 -4.0 -2.5 -0.1 0.4 0.0
Private consumption 1.6 0.4 -1.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.1 0.0
Government consumption 2.3 2.1 2.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 -0.1
Gross fixed capital formation 4.7 -0.9 -10.8 -5.2 -1.6 -0.9 -1.3
— Non-residential private investment 6.2 0.6 -13.2 -7.7 -2.0 -1.1 -0.3
— Residential investment 0.9 -4.6 -10.3 -2.8 -2.5 -2.2 -1.3
— Public investment 4.8 0.9 2.4 0.5 1.2 0.8 1.0
Exports 6.3 0.8 -12.8 -8.0 -1.1 2.9 1.9
Imports 5.5 0.9 -11.4 -7.6 -2.8 2.9 1.3
Contibutions to GDP growth in percentage points
Domestic demand 2.4 0.4 -2.5 -1.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Change in stocks 0.0 0.1 -0.9 -1.0 -0.7 0.5 0.1
External demand 0.4 0.0 -0.7 -0.2 0.6 -0.1 0.2
PRICES AND COSTS (year-on-year rates)
Consumer prices (annual average) 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.0 0.2 -0.4 0.4
GDP deflator 2.4 2.3 1.1 1.8 1.1 0.9 0.4
Unit labour costs 1.6 3.4 3.7 5.7 4.6 3.4 1.3
Compensation per employee 2.5 3.2 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.2
Labour productivity 0.9 -0.2 -2.2 -3.7 -3.0 -1.9 -0.1
GENERAL GOVERNMENT (% of GDP)
Total expenditure 46.0 46.8 50.7
Current expenditure 42.3 43.1 46.5
Public investment 2.6 2.5 2.8
Total revenue 45.4 44.9 44.4
Primary deficit (–) / surplus(+) 2.3 1.0 -3.5
Deficit (–) / surplus (+) -0.6 -2.0 -6.3
LABOUR MARKET
Total employment (quarter-on-quarter rates) 1.8 0.7 -1.9 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3
Unemployment (% of labour force) 7.5 7.6 9.4 8.8 9.3 9.7 9.8
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (% of GDP)
Current account 0.2 -1.6 -0.6 -1.7 -1.0 -0.2 0.3
DEBT RATIOS
Households (% of GDI) 94.2 94.3 95.4 94.0 94.5 94.9 95.4
Non-financial corporations (% of GOS) 455.8 492.2 543.8 508.2 529.9 540.9 543.8
2009
2007 2008 2009
EURO AREA: MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS (a)  TABLE 4.1
SOURCES: ECB, European Commission and OECD. 
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recessions in the euro area, and could be a consequence of the reforms stemming from 
the Treaty of Lisbon, progressively adopted in the labour market over the past decade, 
and also of the incentives in several countries, such as France, Italy and Germany, to con-
tain job destruction and human capital loss through subsidised reductions in working 
hours.
The response of employment varied widely from country to country, not only because dif-
ferent economic policy measures were implemented, but also because of the different pro-
ductive structures and labour market regulations. Thus, in Germany employment fell by 
practically zero, while in other countries, such as Spain and Ireland, the fall reached figures 
of around 10%.
After reaching a high of more than 4% in July 2008, inflation turned downwards and posted 
negative values in mid-2009 (see Chart 4.2). This substantial fall was basically due to the de-
cline in commodities prices, particularly those of energy, which fed through to the energy and 
food components of the HICP. Compounding this was the weakness of domestic demand and 
the under-utilisation of plant capacity which, along with the lagged effect of lower commodities 
prices, slowed the rate of change of the less volatile components of the HICP (services and 
non-energy industrial goods).
Inflation fell sharply, initially 
affected by the more volatile 
components of the HICP and 
subsequently also by the more 
stable ones
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Private-sector financing slowed further in 2009 and in the opening months of 2010, in line with 
its customary cyclical pattern. In the case of non-financial corporations, the slowdown was 
extensive to all euro area countries and reflects the influence both of demand factors, due to 
the lesser need for funds to finance diminishing productive investment and current assets, and 
of supply factors, due to the aforementioned tightening of bank credit standards (see Chart 
4.3). For some larger firms it proved possible to partly offset the fall in bank loans, the main 
component of corporate finance, through direct recourse to the capital markets.
In the case of households, credit eased less sharply, following the strong loss of momentum 
over the past two years. The slowdown affected consumer loans to a greater degree while 
house purchase loans began to show muted signs of recovery in 2009 Q4. This pick-up, ac-
cording to the Bank Lending Survey, would reflect a rise in demand against the backdrop of a 
marked decrease in interest rates and declines in house prices.
Urgent action taken by European governments following the escalation of the financial 
crisis in autumn 2008 contributed, together with the Eurosystem’s generous liquidity provi-
sion policy, to checking the deterioration of the main financial stress indicators. However, 
in early 2009 the absence of any signs of improvement in the economic situation and the 
high uncertainty on financial markets prompted the economic authorities to implement ad-
ditional support measures. This action, further to specific objectives such as enhancing the 
interest rate transmission mechanism, containing the slide in aggregate demand and rem-
edying the difficulties of certain banks, sought to sustain and improve private agents’ con-
fidence and to prevent highly unfavourable scenarios from materialising. The measures 
taken generally fulfilled their aims.
The ECB continued to cut monetary policy rates, lowering the rate on its main refinancing 
operations to 1% in May, which made for a total cut of 325 bp from October 2008 (see Chart 
4.4). These decisions were accompanied by a policy to support credit using non-conventional 
measures. In particular, certain measures adopted in 2008 were continued, such as the exten-
sion of the list of assets eligible as collateral and the supply of funds in longer-term and foreign 
currency operations, using fixed interest rates with full allotment in all tender operations. In 
Financing to the private sector 
continued to slow, markedly so 
in the case of non-financial 
corporations
Given the seriousness of the 
situation, economic authorities 
continued to apply crisis-
combating measures…
... with conventional and non-
conventional monetary policy 
measures...
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addition, three new twelve-month unlimited liquidity-providing operations and a covered bond 
purchase programme were introduced. The Eurosystem’s aim hereby was to provide for a 
swift and sharp fall in market interest rates and in those set by financial institutions in their 
asset-side operations, to alleviate the lack of activity on wholesale funding markets and, in 
short, to strengthen the flow of credit to households and firms.
The tax authorities of euro area countries progressively adopted discretionary tax measures to 
stimulate demand, largely as part of the November 2008 European Economic Recovery Plan. 
These actions accounted for an estimated amount of 1.1% of GDP in 2009 and will total 0.8% 
in 2010 as a whole. The provisions adopted included cuts in taxes and social security pay-
ments, and increases in transfers and direct government spending, which was largely targeted 
at construction and infrastructure renewal. The fiscal drive in the various countries gave rise to 
very different outturns, essentially depending on the initial situation of public finances and the 
impact of the crisis.
... discretionary tax measures…
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Lastly, governments also deployed plans to support the financial system, approved in 
many cases during autumn 2008 within the common framework of principles agreed in 
the EU to ensure effectiveness and avoid the possibility of distorting competition. The 
measures, which initially focused on the liabilities-side of banks’ balance sheets by apply-
ing guarantees to debt issues and capital injections, were subsequently extended to the 
assets-side with programmes for restructuring impaired assets and guaranteeing their 
value.
From 2009 Q2, following the far-reaching action of central banks and governments in the euro 
area and in the rest of the world, financial conditions gradually returned to normal over the 
year, feeding off the more optimistic signs from the real sector. However, from 2009 Q4 there 
were some localised bouts of instability, such as that of Dubai World in November, while the 
deterioration in Greece’s fiscal situation began to generate growing strains in the euro area’s 
government debt markets.
EURIBOR interest rates reached minimum levels in September 2009 in the wake of mone-
tary policy stimuli and the narrowing of risk premia. The twelve-month EURIBOR stabilised 
at around 1.2% and the risk premium, measured as the difference between the twelve-
month EURIBOR and the twelve-month EUREPO, fell gradually to levels close to 50 bp, after 
it had exceeded 200 bp at the height of the tension. The abatement of investor uncertainty 
was also discernible in less volatile financial asset prices and a substantial recovery in share 
prices for the year as a whole, although they did not reach their pre-crisis levels. In this re-
spect, risk premia fell notably, particularly sharply for debt instruments of poorer credit quality 
(see Chart 4.5).
As a result of improved financial conditions, banks resorted less to State guarantees for their 
debt issues and some even repaid the public funds received during the period of greatest in-
stability. Also, the lower cost of financing boosted activity on primary securities markets, par-
... and plans to support the 
financial system
3 The improvement in 
financial conditions, the 
beginning of the recovery 
and the Greek fiscal crisis
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ticularly in the case of non-financial corporations’ issues, in contrast with the sharp moderation 
in financing through bank loans.
This process of financial market stabilisation during 2009, together with the recovery of some 
non-euro area economies and the effect of the economic policy stimuli implemented in the 
euro area, enabled the euro area economy to emerge from the recession in 2009 H2. It posted 
positive quarter-on-quarter growth rates, although these were low and subject to a certain 
degree of volatility. This pick-up was underpinned by export growth (in keeping with the mo-
mentum of international trade), by the expansion of government consumption and investment, 
and by the positive contribution of stockbuilding, while household consumption and private 
investment remained depressed.
Euro-area inflation turned positive in the closing months of the year and reached 1.5% in April 
2010, mainly as a result of the rise in the energy component of the HICP (tied to the gradual 
increase in commodities prices). Conversely, the prices of the less volatile components of the 
The progressive return to 
financial stability, together with 
the recovery of external 
demand and support from 
economic policies, was 
conducive to the euro area 
emerging from recession in 
2009 H2
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the effect of energy prices
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HICP (services and non-energy industrial goods) remained on a slowing path against a back-
drop of continued weak domestic demand.
In this setting the euro exchange rate progressively appreciated, a movement interrupted at 
year-end due to the worsening of the Greek crisis and the release of some relatively unfavour-
able macroeconomic data. Nevertheless, it was subject to notable fluctuations and did not 
perform uniformly against the major currencies. Its appreciation against the US dollar, the yen 
and Asian currencies tied to the dollar was partially offset by its depreciation against sterling 
and the Swiss franc (see Chart 4.5).
From end-2009 the markets were highly conditioned by the Greek fiscal crisis, which height-
ened sharply in spring 2010. That resulted in a drastic correction of trends on euro area finan-
cial markets. In addition to the strains on sovereign debt markets which are discussed below, 
share prices fell sharply, particularly in the banking sector due to its exposure to sovereign 
debt. And on the foreign exchange markets there was a correction in the euro in May 2010 
that brought it to levels close to those recorded during the Lehman Brothers’ crisis in autumn 
2008. This build-up of risks to financial stability in the euro area led European governments 
and authorities to adopt further extraordinary measures on 10 May, which are detailed in the 
following section.
Government action, which in many cases exhausted the available room for manoeuvre, and, 
in particular, the operation of the automatic stabilisers prompted an unprecedented deteriora-
tion in public finances in the euro area countries. The euro area budget deficit stood at 6.3% 
in 2009, its highest level in recent decades and considerably up on the figure of 2% posted in 
2008 (see Chart 4.6).
This was firsthy the result of strong growth in expenditure, which stood at more than 50% 
of GDP (4 pp up on the previous year), due to the increase in social benefits, and in govern-
ment consumption and investment. Furthermore, the fall in revenue (to 44% of GDP) was 
steeper than that observed in other recessions not only because of the tax cuts introduced 
but also because of the sharp contraction in certain sources of revenue which, during the 
previous upturn, had shown unusually high elasticity to GDP (such as revenue linked to the 
real estate boom in certain euro area countries and that linked to business profits).
As a result, the permanent or structural component of the fiscal downturn has been consider-
able and, on European Commission estimates, it would account for practically half of the total 
deterioration. Therefore, neither the gradual withdrawal of the stimulus measures nor the in-
cipient economic recovery will permit a notable reduction in the fiscal imbalance. Furthermore, 
forecasts indicate that public debt will rise to close to 85% of GDP in 2010, despite the fact 
that government intervention to stabilise the financial system to date has had a limited impact 
on debt levels (less than 3 pp) (see Chart 4.6).
The fiscal deterioration was common to all euro area countries and resulted in an excep-
tional situation as far as the application of the Stability and Growth Pact is concerned. In 
spring 2009, Ecofin resolved to initiate the excessive deficit procedure for Greece, Spain, 
France and Ireland, whose deficits had exceeded 3% of GDP in 2008, and in December a 
further eight countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia 
and Slovakia) were added. Consequently, 13 euro area member states were subject to this 
procedure (including Malta), and in May 2010 the European Commission initiated the same 
The euro appreciated gradually 
during 2009, although this 
trajectory was interrupted at the 
end of the year due to the 
outbreak of the Greek crisis
The Greek crisis conditioned 
developments on financial 
markets in the final stretch of 
2009 and in early 2010
3.2 THE DETERIORATION OF 
PUBLIC FINANCES AND THE 
GREEK FISCAL CRISIS
In 2009 there was an 
unprecedented deterioration in 
public finances…
... due to the increase in public 
spending and, to a lesser 
degree, to the fall in revenue
It will be difficult to correct the 
fiscal imbalance since the 
structural component of the 
deficit is very high and public 
debt may reach close to 90% in 
2010 
13 of the 16 euro area Member 
States are running an excessive 
deficit
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procedure for the three remaining countries, although when this report went to press the ini-
tiation of these proceedings had not been decided upon by the Council.
As shown in Box 4.1, the deterioration of fiscal positions against a backdrop of more pru-
dent risk pricing was reflected in the widening of sovereign spreads in the euro area during 
2009. This situation came to a head in spring 2010 as a consequence of the Greek crisis. 
The high levels of public debt in Greece, together with the deterioration of its economic 
outlook and its loss of credibility as a result of the serious shortcomings detected in its sta-
tistics, heightened uncertainty about the Greek government’s ability to refinance its debt. 
The Greek authorities were compelled to design various tax adjustment measures at the 
same time as the Eurogroup, the European Commission, the ECB and IMF made progress 
in designing a mechanism to support these measures through the provision of conditional 
financial assistance to the Greek economy. However, these measures did not manage to 
stabilise the situation. On the contrary, Greek bonds continued to lose value and this trend 
began to spread to those euro area economies whose public finances had deteriorated 
most as a result of the crisis.
The fiscal deterioration and the 
Greek crisis triggered severe 
bouts of financial instability on 
sovereign debt markets
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BOX 4.1SOVEREIGN DEBT SPREADS IN THE EURO AREA
Since the creation of the European Monetary Union, yield spreads 
between the various euro area sovereign bonds had held at relatively 
low values (see Panel 1). With the onset of the financial turbulence in 
mid-2007, greater spreads began to be observed. These widened 
notably during the period of most financial instability, following the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Relatively high sovereign 
spreads persisted during 2009, and in recent months high tensions 
prevailed in the area’s public debt markets as a result of the Greek 
crisis and following revelations of this country’s serious statistical 
shortcomings, which masked a worrying fiscal situation. In late Janu-
ary and early February 2010, the yield on 10-year Greek bonds rose 
to 7%, while the German benchmark stood at around 3.2%. The 
Greek yield shot up to over 12% on 7 May, the day before the ap-
proval by the Ecofin and the ECB of a package of measures to pre-
serve stability in the euro area (discussed in the main body of this 
chapter). The tensions also affected the other sovereign bonds in the 
euro area, albeit unevenly so depending on the issuer. Irish and Por-
tuguese bonds, after those of Greece, lost most value (with yields 
standing at 6% on 10-year debt), followed by Italian and Spanish 
benchmark bonds (whose rates stood at over 4%).
In a monetary union, differing yields on government bonds - with the 
same maturity - are reflected in liquidity and credit risk premia. The 
latter would reflect the return demanded by investors for exposing 
themselves to the risk of a bond default event, a return that could also 
be approximated by the cost of credit default swaps (CDSs), a finan-
cial instrument which enables insurance to be taken against this 
event. As Panel 2 illustrates, tracking the course of the sovereign 
CDSs for the euro area countries relative to the German sovereign 
CDS, default risk premia would account for a major part of the yield 
spreads over Germany since 2007. These premia will depend both 
on the amount of sovereign risk perceived by investors, which will be 
related to the country’s solvency, and on the price of the risk, which 
will be determined by investors’ readiness to assume risks.
From 2007, then, part of the spreads should reflect the increase in 
the price of risk, against a global background of high uncertainty, 
particularly since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Faced with a 
situation of unprecedented instability, investors demanded greater 
compensation for bearing risks, which affected countries with weak-
er fiscal positions to a greater extent. For this same reason, the finan-
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BOX 4.1SOVEREIGN DEBT SPREADS IN THE EURO AREA (cont´d)
cial stabilisation in train globally since spring 2009, which led volatility 
back to close to its end-2007 levels, had a favourable bearing on 
sovereign debt spreads in the euro area.
However, the increase in premia should also reflect a change in the 
perception of euro area countries’ sovereign risk. The crisis has en-
tailed a rapid deterioration in the member countries’ fiscal situation 
and the massive deployment of public aid to the banking system has 
also exposed their fiscal position to the possible fragilities of financial 
institutions1 (see Panel 3). That led to a situation in which several 
euro area countries saw their credit ratings downgraded during 
2009. The Greek credit rating was downgraded on two occasions 
by Fitch and S&P to BBB+, while Moody’s downgraded it a notch to 
A2 (equivalent to A). Ireland lost the AAA rating that three agencies 
had assigned to it, and was downgraded to AA— in the case of 
Fitch. Finally, S&P downgraded Spain a notch to AA+, and Portugal 
to A+. The spread of tensions in spring 2010 led to further down-
grades in Portugal and in Spain, and above all in Greece, where S&P 
withdrew the investment-grade rating for Greek debt, assigning it a 
rating of BB+.
To sum up the significance of the determinants, Panel 4 gives a 
breakdown of the change in 10-year sovereign spreads since mid-
2007 using a simple regression model.2 The exercise runs only to 
November 2009, given the information available at the time of this 
report going to press. As can be seen, the increase in spreads 
over the German Bund during this period was generalised, though 
the scale of the increase by country differed greatly. Firstly, a com-
mon overall factor of higher risk is identified, which would have 
pushed yields upwards, and which has been approximated by the 
implied volatility of the German stock market index, or VDAX. A 
relevant role is not obtained, however, for liquidity (due possibly to 
the difficulties of approximating this variable in this framework of 
analysis), although the common factor might be partly incorporat-
ing the presence of higher liquidity premia at a time of greater 
uncertainty. A positive contribution by the idiosyncratic factors as-
sociated with the countries’ fiscal position is obtained. Finally, the 
volume of public aid to the banking sector would have played a 
determining role only in the case of Ireland.3 The presence, none-
theless, of a sizeable unexplained component in the cases of 
Greece and Ireland might indicate non-linear behaviour by the 
spreads and, in the case of Greece, the credibility problems that 
had been disclosed. 
Accordingly, sovereign debt yield spreads in the euro area during the 
crisis, and particularly in spring 2010, illustrate how investors may 
show enormous sensitivity to weakened fiscal positions, a reaction 
which is exacerbated at times of global instability and which entails 
notable financial risks. The persistence of high risk premia may be 
expected to feed through to the cost of debt when governments refi-
nance it, which will hamper fiscal consolidation plans. A public spend-
ing structure entailing higher interest payments might also be detri-
mental to the economy’s potential growth. This reinforces the impor-
tance for governments of safeguarding fiscal stability in the medium 
term. Further, as a result of the crisis, investors will tend to be more 
cautious in the face of risks, at a time in which a portion of such risks 
is feeding through from the private to the public sector. Under these 
conditions, a greater degree of discrimination on public debt markets 
may be expected as may, therefore, conditions that are particularly 
unfavourable for government paper issued by States that do not 
adopt credible consolidation strategies with the urgency that the situ-
ation requires. 
1. Support to the financial system is not in the main reflected in the budget 
deficit and public debt figures. This is due to the nature of these measures - 
e.g. public guarantees only generate contingent liabilities - and, in some cases, 
to their implementation through companies classified outside the public sec-
tor. 2. What is involved here is a linear regression of the sovereign spreads of 
10 euro area countries over the German Bund with data from June 2007 to 
November 2009. Used as explanatory variables are the VDAX — to approxi-
mate the overall common factor of uncertainty — and the idiosyncratic factors 
which show the European Commission’s budget deficit and public debt projec-
tions (interacting with the VDAX to capture the greater relevance of the fiscal 
position at times of instability). A liquidity variable approximated by the weight 
in the euro area of the country’s long-term issues is included. All the variables 
are expressed relative to the related German benchmark.
3. Most of the increases in sovereign spreads came about further to the an-
nouncement of the financial bail-out plans. Ireland has considerably greater 
exposure, owing to the fact that in September 2008 its government approved, 
for a period of two years, a guarantee on the liabilities of the main banks, which 
initially entailed contingent liabilities close to 200% of GDP.
On 23 April the Greek government formally requested the activation of the support pro-
gramme designed by the Eurogroup, which met this request on 2 May through the unani-
mous approval of a programme of bilateral loans of up to €110 billion over three years (€80 billion 
from the euro area Member States and the remainder from the IMF). This plan is subject to 
strict conditionality and close monitoring, which is detailed in  2 of the April 2010 Economic 
Bulletin. On the same day, and as part of the strict conditionality, Greece approved an ambi-
tious fiscal adjustment and structural reform programme jointly negotiated with the IMF, the 
European Commission and the ECB. The implementation of this programme will be evaluated 
quarterly. Further, in keeping with its favourable assessment of the Greek government’s ad-
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 ANNUAL REPORT, 2009 4.THE EURO AREA AND THE COMMON MONETARY POLICY
justment plan, the ECB decided to suspend the application of the minimum credit rating 
threshold for Greek debt.
Following its initial positive impact, activation of the support plan for Greece was insufficient 
to halt the worsening of the strains which continued to spread to other member countries. 
In response, governments undertook on 10 May to bring forward their budgetary consolida-
tion plans and Ecofin announced the creation of a European Financial Stabilisation Mecha-
nism capable of mobilising $500 million of European funds (more than 5.5% of euro area 
GDP), which will be supplemented by further funding from the IMF and, as in the case of the 
Greek support plan, will be subject to strict conditionality. Similarly, in order for the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism to function normally again, the ECB decided to conduct 
sterilised interventions in the dysfunctional segments of public and private debt markets 
through a Securities Markets Programme; to strengthen liquidity provision during May and 
June by reactivating some measures previously adopted in relation to three and six-month 
tenders; and, in coordination with other central banks, to resume US dollar liquidity-provid-
ing operations.
Available forecasts point to a period of moderate and faltering growth with low inflation in 
2010 H1. Internal demand is expected to remain weak, given the high degree of slack in the 
economy (low capacity utilisation and high unemployment), low business margins and the 
progressive petering out of the impulse of the policies applied. And this in a setting in which 
bank, corporate and, in some cases, household balance sheets remain fragile and in which 
general government faces, in some countries, the need to pursue, with some degree of ur-
gency, ambitious fiscal consolidation measures (see Chart 4.7). The subdued nature of the 
pick-up in activity, along with the under- utilisation of plant capacity and the wage restraint 
that may be expected given the slackness of the labour market, will enable inflation to hold 
at a lower level. In any event, these projections are subject to considerable uncertainty: on 
one hand, because of the continuing presence of vulnerabilities, on which the pace of the 
emergence from the crisis may hinge; and on the other, because this pace will also depend 
crucially on how the economic authorities address the challenges facing them.
Primarily, the international financial crisis and economic recession have severely affected the 
banking system. As the ECB and the IMF have highlighted, banks remain exposed to potential 
losses in light of the foreseeable materialisation of credit risk on their books. Further, the bank-
ing system, which remains highly reliant on the public aid received, will be subject to regula-
tory changes and to redimensioning.
To date, the adjustment of bank balance sheets has essentially involved the reduction of their 
foreign assets and of interbank positions. However, it cannot be fully ruled out that, if the proc-
ess continues, it will ultimately affect the supply of bank financing and, therefore, the pace of 
the recovery.
The crisis generated excess plant capacity, which will tend to delay the need for new invest-
ment, while the redimensioning needed in certain productive sectors - the car industry, 
construction and the financial sector - may continue to bear negatively not only on the de-
mand for labour, but also on supply. Potential employees will need to acquire the appropri-
ate skills to improve their employability in the more dynamic sectors. Further, the foreseeable 
re-establishment of standard working hours poses doubts about the true dynamism of em-
ployment during the recently initiated phase of recovery. This unfavourable labour market 
outlook and the losses in wealth that have built up might translate into greater-than-expect-
ed precautionary saving. 
4 Outlook and economic 
policy challenges
Available forecasts point to a 
period of weak and gradual 
recovery, with low inflation, and 
it will be some time before 
production reaches its pre-crisis 
levels
In the financial field, banks 
continue to address the repair 
of their balance sheets and the 
restructuring of the sector
Surplus plant capacity will 
detract from investment and the 
labour market situation will 
hinder a rapid recovery in 
consumption 
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In this situation, the robustness of the recovery will hinge crucially on how skilfully euro area 
governments and the ECB time the withdrawal of the exceptional measures adopted and duly 
undertake those other measures needed to ensure financial stability in the area, to minimise 
the risk of a fresh slump in activity and to promote higher potential growth. 
Progressive financial normalisation and the improved economic outlook over the course of 
2009 meant that the Eurosystem, so as to prevent the market distortions that might arise if 
the extraordinary measures were maintained longer than needed, was able to begin with-
drawing those measures that were no longer necessary, while maintaining a generous liquid-
ity-provision policy. Thus, after holding the third and final one-year refinancing operation in 
December, six-month injections were not extended after the operation in March this year. 
Subsequently, the ECB Council decided that, as from 2010 Q2, its regular three-month refi-
nancing operations would resume the habitual variable-rate procedure, while weekly and 
special one-month tenders would continue to be at a fixed rate with full allotment, at least 
until October. 
This gradual winding down of the extraordinary measures had to be regulated as a result of the 
market tensions stemming from the Greek crisis. The ECB decided to reinforce once again the 
provision of liquidity at three and six months and to resume dollar-denominated operations, while 
it adopted a programme of intervention in those government and private debt market segments 
whose dysfunctionality was hindering the proper working of monetary policy transmission mech-
anisms. These interventions are being neutralised so as not to affect the policy stance and not to 
interfere with expectations as to the future course of official interest rates. 
Once the tensions have been overcome, the exit strategy should be resumed in order to converge 
on an operational framework that reflects the lessons of the crisis; and, in this respect, the initial 
framework is a good point of reference in light of the flexibility and robustness it has demonstrated.
In addition, monetary policy will have to calibrate the risks to price stability, in a scenario of 
slow growth and high uncertainty. Moreover, it will be highly dependent on the measures im-
plemented in other economic policy areas. 
Action by governments and the 
ECB will be key in determining 
the pace of emergence from 
the crisis 
4.1. MONETARY POLICY
There was a regulated and 
gradual withdrawal of the  
extraordinary measures in the 
spring of 2010, with a very 
generous liquidity provision 
policy being maintained
In the medium term, the main 
challenge is to maintain price 
stability, in a setting of low 
growth but exceptional 
uncertainty 
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More specifically, due regard must be had to the risks of the still-ongoing normalisation of the 
financial system being interrupted by occasional tensions that hamper satisfying the greater 
demand for credit that will arise once the pick-up in activity takes root. But, above all, the re-
cent experience in Greece illustrates the severity of the problems that would arise from an in-
sufficient commitment by governments to the necessary fiscal consolidation.
The challenge facing fiscal policy is to set in place budgetary consolidation plans that ensure 
sound public finances in the medium term and which provide the room for manoeuvre needed 
to withstand future crises and the consequences of population ageing. At the start of the re-
covery, uncertainty over the economy’s capacity to sustain growth, once the demand-stimulus 
and credit-support measures were withdrawn, advised regulating the necessary spending 
cuts and tax increases with prudence. But the recent bout of tensions on European debt mar-
kets stemming from the Greek crisis has highlighted a growing sensitivity to the budgetary 
position of certain countries that advises accelerating the design and, in some cases, the im-
plementation of sufficiently ambitious fiscal consolidation plans. 
The EU Council of ministers took these considerations into account when establishing the 
basic guidelines for the fiscal consolidation process in the coming years. In particular, it was 
agreed in December 2009 that the adjustment should broadly begin in 2011 and that it would 
be conditional upon the situation of each country. Under the Stability and Growth Pact, the 
year 2013 was set as a deadline for the correction of excessive deficits in most cases, except 
for Ireland and Greece (2014) and Belgium and Italy (2012). The annual structural adjustment 
that each country must make on average during the established correction period ranges from 
0.5 pp in the cases of Germany and Italy to almost 3 pp in that of Greece. 
At the start of 2010, all the euro area countries submitted their respective Stability Programmes 
to the European Commission. The Commission’s assessment at the end of March acknowl-
edged the effort made by the Member States in their response, but expressed certain reserva-
tions. In particular, it warned that the fiscal projections in most of the programmes were based 
on relatively favourable macroeconomic scenarios and, at the same time, it requested more 
details on the specific measures governments intended to adopt. 
According to these Programmes, euro area fiscal policy in 2010 will continue contributing to 
sustaining the economic recovery and the deficit may rise to almost 7% of GDP, although there 
are notable differences in the various members’ fiscal exit strategies. In Germany, tax cuts and 
the other measures agreed upon entail a stimulus on a similar scale to that in 2009 (2 pp of 
GDP), and in France, too, investment-boosting initiatives have been introduced. Conversely, 
Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Spain implemented fiscal adjustment plans at the start of the 
year which were stepped up in the three latter countries in May, against the background of the 
enormous instability generated by the Greek crisis. The Spanish programme and its subse-
quent reinforcement are explained in detail in chapter 5 in this Annual Report. 
At the behest of Ecofin, Greece submitted additional budgetary measures in mid-March, quan-
tified at 2% of Greek GDP, and on 2 May it approved a new fiscal adjustment package aimed 
at cutting the deficit by 5 pp of GDP in 2010, placing it below 3% in 2014. Progress in the 
implementation of this plan is subject to strict monitoring by the IMF and the EC, on a quar-
terly basis. 
In contrast, in later years the adjustment will be of a more generalised nature if the commit-
ments established are met. These posit a gradual reduction in the overall euro area deficit to 
below 3% in 2013. But most of the countries have yet to undertake the unavoidable task of 
4.2 BUDGETARY CONSOLIDATION 
AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF 
PUBLIC FINANCES
To restore soundness to public 
finances, sustained 
improvements will be needed in 
structural balances over the 
coming years 
In late 2009 Ecofin approved a 
roadmap for the fiscal 
consolidation of the EU 
countries and for the correction 
of excessive deficits 
The initial Stability Programmes 
revealed substantial differences 
across the Member States’ 
fiscal consolidation strategies 
And many countries have yet to 
design their consolidation 
strategy 
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designing, as soon as possible, ambitious and credible fiscal consolidation measures that 
prevent growing financing needs from pushing long-term interest rates upwards, and thereby 
hampering the recovery in investment and private consumption.
The implementation of these plans might have an adverse impact on aggregate demand in the 
economy, which will be less if the greater budgetary discipline contributes to reducing sover-
eign risk premia and the interest rates on public debt. In this respect, past experience reveals 
the existence of certain episodes where the effects of fiscal consolidation on economic growth 
were limited (see Box 4.2). 
In addition, in a scenario such as that at present, marked by low potential growth, the imple-
mentation of a sustained structural adjustment may prove more complex than in past epi-
sodes. It is thus important, firstly, that consolidation should be pursued bearing in mind the 
impact of the measures on the supply side of the economy (in particular, the potential disincen-
tive effect on employment and saving entailed by some taxes and the effects of public spend-
ing on innovation and on education). But it will also be essential to accompany these measures 
with other complementary reforms. These include most notably the reform of pensions and 
social security systems to lessen the consequences of demographic changes on spending 
projections and, above all, those reforms aimed directly at raising the economy’s potential 
growth and at ensuring the area’s financial stability.
The economic crisis may conceivably have reduced the euro area’s productive capacity. Con-
stricted investment, the greater uncertainty associated with risky projects such as innovation 
and the loss of human capital linked to high unemployment levels may readily result in a per-
sistent reduction in the level of potential output. There are, in fact, estimates that place this 
contraction at close to 4% over five years.
To reduce the scale and persistence of this impact, initiatives are needed to promote econo-
mies’ ability to create new business opportunities and to ensure the necessary flexibility is in 
place to reallocate resources towards these market segments. At the same time, it is impor-
tant to eliminate the support measures for specific sectors that may hold back the adjustment, 
distorting the competitive conditions of the single market (see Table 4.2). The recovery will only 
take on self- sustaining dynamism once the effects of the transitory stimulus policies are re-
moved.
To date, the increase in unemployment has been centred particularly on countries that have 
been subject to marked sectoral restructuring and/or that show high labour market segmenta-
tion. But even in those countries where job destruction is proving more moderate, there are 
groups in which the effects of the crisis have been very virulent: temporary workers, the young 
and the low-skilled. 
Training the unemployed to ease their transition towards new jobs and to prevent unemploy-
ment from becoming structural is therefore essential. Lifelong training and the improved edu-
cation of the young would enhance the capacity of these groups to respond to the needs of 
the labour market, preventing circumstances such as those at present from leading ultimately 
to a permanent full-off in their participation rates, with the subsequent adverse effects on the 
economy’s potential growth. Further, it is advisable to review collective bargaining arrange-
ments, to lessen the downward stickiness of wages in recessions and to allow for a better 
adaptation by firms to economic conditions.
The potential adverse effects on 
growth in the short run will be 
less if the measures are 
sufficiently ambitious and 
accompanied by other 
structural reforms 
4.3 OTHER STRUCTURAL 
REFORM POLICIES
The crisis may have had a 
significant adverse impact on 
the euro area economies’ 
potential growth …
... the duration and intensity of 
which will depend on the 
economic policies adopted
Improving the labour market 
through training for the 
unemployed, lifelong training 
and youth education …
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Over the coming years, European countries will have to effect a highly 
demanding adjustment of their budgetary imbalances. Indeed, in some 
instances this has already begun. Although there is broad consensus 
regarding the benefits of fiscal consolidation in the medium and long 
run, the short-term effects are subject to greater uncertainty. 
The literature on past fiscal consolidation experiences reveals the 
existence of numerous episodes where the effects on short-term 
economic growth were limited or even positive. The most closely 
studied instances are the consolidation processes undertaken in 
Denmark (1983-1986) and Ireland (1987-1989), which were ac-
companied by a significant pick-up in economic growth.1
Other papers suggest that these findings are not confined exclu-
sively to small economies: for example, Giudice et al. (2007) as-
certain that approximately half the consolidation processes under-
taken by EU countries in the last 30 years have been accompa-
nied by high growth, relative to the prior and subsequent 
periods.2
But consolidation had never been so global or so demanding; 
and, therefore, transferring these experiences to the current sit-
uation is a questionable exercise. One recent episode was that 
experienced by the European countries during the 1993-1997 
period, when compliance with the convergence criteria govern-
ing entry into the euro area entailed a widespread and large-
scale fiscal consolidation. Specifically, the correction of the cy-
clically adjusted primary balance in the euro area countries was 
2.2% of GDP (3.1% if the total balance is used). This figure is 
only slightly down on the reduction of the cyclically adjusted pri-
BOX 4.2FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN THE EURO AREA COUNTRIES
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
0.00 0.4 0.00 0.5
0.09 2.7 0.09 2.6
0.73 18.4 0.73 18.4
0.06 1.8 -- --
-- -- -0.01 -0.2
-- -- 0.07 2.0
Euro 
area
Germany France Italy Spain Greece Ireland Portugal Finland Belgium Netherlands Austria Japan
United 
States
United 
Kingdom
Budget balance 3.1 0.4 3.1 7.4 3.9 6.0 4.1 4.2 7.0 5.2 1.6 2.4 -1.7 4.1 5.8
Structural balance 2.2 0.1 3.2 6.3 3.9 6.2 1.5 4.2 2.8 4.2 0.7 2.2 -1.9 3.4 4.3
Public spending -2.8 0.1 -0.8 -6.1 -7.3 -1.5 -8.0 -2.3 -8.5 -3.7 -8.2 -2.7 -1.0 -2.7 -4.5
Government consumpti -0.7 -0.2 -0.2 -1.7 -1.6 3.2 -2.6 0.7 -1.9 0.1 -1.7 -0.5 1.5 -1.7 -2.0
Public investment -0.6 -0.9 -0.6 -0.4 -1.1 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -1.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.9
Public revenue 0.3 0.5 2.3 1.3 -3.4 4.5 -3.8 1.8 -1.5 1.5 -6.6 -0.4 0.1 1.5 1.3
Direct taxes 0.2 -0.3 1.3 0.1 -0.1 1.9 -0.9 0.9 2.8 1.3 -3.9 1.0 -1.5 1.8 1.0
Indirect taxes 0.5 0.0 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 -0.2 0.8 0.2 -0.4 0.4 -0.2 0.8
Public debt 8.5 13.8 13.0 2.4 8.1 3.5 -30.4 -0.2 -1.5 -12.0 -10.3 3.5 28.6 -4.6 5.2
Average GDP growth 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.4 2.1 1.7 7.6 2.2 3.3 2.0 3.0 1.9 1.4 3.6 3.1
Difference from 
average for 1980-
2009
-0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 2.0 -0.4 0.6 -0.1 0.5 -0.2 -0.7 0.6 0.7
EQUATION 1 EQUATION 2
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Constant
Change in private consumption in t-1
Change in GDP
Consolidation dummy * DGC
Change in gvt. consumption (DGC)
Non-consolidation dummy * DGC
Explanatory variables
Observations
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SOURCES: European Commission and Banco de España. 
 
a. 2010-2012. 
1 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION ON PRIVATE CONSUMPTION IN 
THE EURO AREA 
Equation estimated with panel data for the 1982-2008 period  
2 FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN THE 1993-1997 PERIOD 
1. See Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), “Can severe fiscal contractions be expan-
sionary? Tales of two small European countries”, NBER Macroeconomic An-
nual, 5, pp. 75-111.
2. G. Giudice, A. Turini y J. in’t Veld (2007), “Non Keynesian fiscal adjustments? 
A close look at expansionary fiscal consolidations in the EU”, Open Economic 
Review, 18, pp. 613-630.
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mary deficit of 3% of GDP (4% in terms of the total balance) that 
the euro area countries will have to tackle on average over the 
2010-2013 period, to place the deficit below 3% within the term 
agreed upon under the SGP, as inferred by the Stability and 
Growth Programmes submitted at the end of January 2010. 
Nonetheless, there are notable differences between both peri-
ods in terms of the level of interest rates and the degree of slack 
in the economy. Both then as now, the consolidation efforts dif-
fer greatly from one country to another (see accompanying 
chart).
As can be seen in the accompanying table 2, despite the general-
ised and intense nature of the fiscal consolidation, GDP growth in 
1993-1997 was only slightly lower than that observed for the 
1980-2009 period on average. Indeed, in Ireland, Finland and the 
Netherlands, growth was higher than the historical average. Un-
questionably, this result reflects the influence of many other fac-
tors, such as the improved financing conditions during that period 
or, in some cases, the impact of the devaluations in the early 
1990s. However, the figures at least suggest the absence of a 
notably adverse impact on economic growth. 
The composition of the consolidation plans in that period might 
have influenced this result, since although the empirical evidence 
available is not unanimous, various papers show that the likeli-
hood of this circumstance occurring increases if the consolida-
tion is based on primary public spending cuts, as occurred in 
those years in almost all the countries, with the exception of 
Greece. There is also evidence that these episodes are more 
likely when preceded by a fiscal crisis, with high levels of public 
debt. 
To verify the scale and the sign of the macroeconomic effects as-
sociated with episodes of fiscal consolidation, one habitual strate-
gy in the literature consists of estimating an equation for private 
consumption, such as that presented in the accompanying table 1. 
Here, in addition to the habitual domestic income variables, fiscal 
variables are included. Dummy variables associated with the fiscal 
consolidation episodes are introduced into the equation, which in-
teract with the fiscal variables, in order to test whether the impact 
of the latter on private consumption varies in the consolidation 
episodes.3 The choice of private consumption is warranted not 
only by the significance of this variable in GDP, but also because, 
from a theoretical standpoint, the fiscal consolidation episodes that 
have a limited impact on economic growth are based on the pres-
ence of agents with rational expectations, who anticipate that the 
current improvement in the budget balance will be accompanied in 
the future by tax cuts - and by the attendant distortionary effects 
– and who, consequently, do not change their consumption deci-
sions in the face of changes in fiscal variables. 
The first column shows the estimated equation for the 1982-2008 
period. On average for the period, the short-term elasticity of pri-
vate consumption is limited (around 0.06) and significant at the 
90% confidence levels. Nonetheless, the second column shows 
that this parameter is not significant when we confine its calcula-
tion to fiscal consolidation episodes. That is to say, the negative 
impact of a reduction in government consumption on private con-
sumption disappears in times of fiscal consolidation. 
In short, the experience from the 1993-1997 period and the econo-
metric evidence presented in this box point to the existence of fiscal 
consolidation episodes that may have moderately impacted eco-
nomic growth in the short run. That said, all due caution is necessary 
when transferring past experiences to the current situation, since the 
effects of fiscal policy depend on many factors, such as the coun-
try’s economic and financial situation, the composition of the plans 
and, most especially, the impact of the fiscal consolidation commit-
ments on agents’ expectations and on sovereign risk premia. In-
deed, the costs in the short run might be less if the adjustments 
prove credible and contribute to reducing sovereign risk premia and 
the interest rates on public debt. Further grounds for caution in this 
analysis stem from the fact that the fiscal consolidation episodes 
that may finally be undertaken are not usually accompanied by sig-
nificant contractions in economic activity, since that would entail the 
potential risk of such plans being abandoned. 
BOX 4.2FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN THE EURO AREA COUNTRIES (cont´d)
3. The equation is estimated with panel data (fixed effects) for the euro area coun-
tries (12) during the 1982-2008 period. All the variables are in logarithms and in per 
capita terms. The unemployment rate and real interest rates were also introduced, 
without proving significant. The equation was also estimated including OECD in-
come, without this altering the conclusions discussed here. Furthermore, only the 
results obtained on estimating the equation with government consumption among 
the fiscal variables are presented, since net taxes did not prove significant.
In the market for goods and services, the full implementation of the Services Directive might contrib-
ute to generating new business and employment opportunities by allowing freedom of establishment 
and free provision of services, and the start-up of the so-called “single window” to reduce administra-
tive formalities for companies. The transposition of this Directive should have been concluded at the 
end of 2009 and, although the European Commission has not yet made a full diagnosis of the de-
gree of transposition, it appears to have been delayed in some Member States. It will further be desir-
able to build on the progress made in recent years regarding the lessening of administrative burdens, 
which have a comparatively greater influence on small and medium-sized enterprises, those most 
affected by the economic crisis, and where there is still considerable room for improvement.
... the full implementation of the 
Services Directive...
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Another key element in the strategy to improve the economy’s potential capacity would involve 
promoting innovation, which has been much afflicted by the high sensitivity it traditionally shows 
to the business cycle, and by the increase in risks and the shortage of funding characterising the 
recent situation. Innovation policy has been highly geared towards increasing public spending on 
R&D and towards the introduction of deductions and subsidies to raise private spending, and a 
more comprehensive approach should surely be adopted, accompanying these measures with 
others aimed at raising the number of science and technology graduates, improving the safe-
guarding of intellectual property rights and access to funding (via, for example, the development 
of venture capital funds), and promoting public/private cooperation projects and joint funding.
Lastly, the challenges in the financial sector involve, on one hand, ensuring that the deleverag-
ing of the banking system comes about in an orderly fashion and, on the other, pushing 
through internationally coordinated regulatory reforms that contribute to setting in place a 
safer global financial system, but which at the same time do not prevent its development. 
Box 3.2 reviews the main international developments in this area. Significant progress has 
been made in Europe towards a new supervisory architecture, based on the recommenda-
... the promotion of innovation …
... and the reform of the 
financial system are key to 
achieving a firm and sustained 
recovery 
LATEST FIGURE
EURO AREA
EURO 
AREA/US
US = 100
EURO AREA
EURO 
AREA/US
US = 100
GDP PER CAPITA AND COMPONENTS
GDP per capita (€1000 current ppp) 21.4 70.2 25.6 69.6 2009
Population aged 15-64/Total population 67.2 101.6 66.5 98.9 2009
Employment rate 61.7 83.3 66.3 96.3 2009
Unemployment rate 8.3 207.5 9.4 101.1 2009
Total factor productivity 6.9 89.0 6.8 84.4 2009
TECHNOLOGICAL LEVEL
Spending on R&D/GDP 1.8 67.4 1.9 69.2 2008
Spending on private R&D/GDP (EU 15) (a) 1.1 56.4 1.1 57.9 2008
Triadic patents per million inhabitants 36.4 71.7 37.7 71.6 2007
ICT spending per capita ... ... 5.3 80.3 2008
Broadband penetration 0.4 16.9 26.4 98.9 2009
Venture capital in the early stages of the investment (EU 15) 0.1 24.8 0.0 45.8 2008
QUALITY OF HUMAN CAPITAL
Public expenditure on education 4.5 77.7 5.0 100.2 2006
Private expenditure on education 0.6 24.7 0.6 25.0 2006
Labour force with tertiary education 21.9 62.9 23.2 38.1 2007
Labour force with secondary education 44.1 85.6 44.4 151.2 2007
Labour force with primary education 33.4 243.5 31.4 330.5 2007
Graduates in science and technology (EU 15) 10.0 103.1 12.8 124.3 2006
     5.4 ... 8.4 ... 2008
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT (b)
Business start-up cost (% of GDP) 9.6 1,371.9 5.5 783.7 2010
Time to start a business (days) 46.3 772.4 15.9 264.3 2010
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Energy intensity of the economy 174.6 80.6 162.1 85.5 2007
Electricity generated by renewable sources (%) (EU 15) 14.6 ... 22.0 ... 2010
LATEST 
FIGURE
2000
EURO AREA: MAIN STRUCTURAL INDICATORS (a)  TABLE 4.2
SOURCES: Eurostat, OECD, World Bank and Banco de España. 
 
a. The series for spending on private R&D starts in 2002. 
b. The series for business environment starts in 2004. 
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tions made in the so-called “Larosière Report”. Specifically, significant steps have been taken 
towards the creation of the ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board), which responds to the 
need to establish a macroprudential supervisory framework that allows the risks to the stabil-
ity of financial systems to be identified. The microprudential realm, geared to the supervision 
of individual institutions, will also be reinforced by the network of supervisory authorities 
grouped together in the ESFS (European System of Financial Supervisors). The creation of 
these agencies and higher levels of capital required of financial institutions are essential ele-
ments for preventing crises of this nature from recurring in the future. 
On 3 March the European Commission published its Europe 2020 Strategy, aimed at revamp-
ing the Lisbon Strategy. This marks the start of a process that should lead to its approval by 
the European Council in mid-2010. The Strategy aims to achieve economic growth based on 
knowledge and innovation, the effective use of resources and social and territorial inclusive-
ness. In this connection it defines a set of specific targets for the 2020 horizon, including an 
increase in employment and investment in R&D, a reduction in pollutant gas emissions, a re-
duction in the percentages of early school leavers and people without tertiary studies, and a 
reduction in those at risk of poverty. In a more resolute way than its forerunner, the Europe 
2020 Strategy should drive the implementation of the structural reforms Europe needs. 
One of the novelties of the Europe 2020 Strategy is its attention to strengthening governance 
and the multilateral surveillance procedures so as to ensure that the commitments made under 
the Strategy translate into effective action on the ground. The need to reinforce the European 
institutional framework - and, in particular, to improve economic policy coordination in the euro 
area - has undoubtedly been one of the lessons to be drawn from the recent Greek public debt 
crisis. Indeed, in mid-May the European Commission unveiled a proposal for reforms in three 
key areas: the reinforcement of surveillance procedures in respect of competitiveness and 
macroeconomic imbalances, setting in place a systematic framework for their diagnosis; the 
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, to strengthen its preventive arm, to give greater rele-
vance to public debt and to aspects relating to the sustainability of public finances, and to 
strengthen the incentives and mechanisms that ensure strict compliance with the commit-
ments acquired; and, finally, to push through the design of a permanent mechanism for the 
resolution of potential future crises in which, inevitably, any financial support decision would be 
subject to the principle of strict conditionality.
The bolstering of the Lisbon 
agenda sought by the adoption 
of the EU-2020 Strategy is a 
step in the right direction...
... and also envisages the need 
to improve the institutional 
framework of European 
economic governance
